We present a dictator game experiment where the recipients are local charities that serve the poor. Donors consist of approximately 1000 participants from a nationally representative sample. We manipulate the perceived worthiness and race of the charities' recipients with an audiovisual presentation. Respondents then decide how much to give to the charities and report their perceptions of recipient worthiness and racial composition. We have four main findings. First, treatments describing recipients as worthy significantly increase giving. Second, the treatment where respondents viewed photos mostly of black recipients rather than white recipients had no significant effect on giving, even though it successfully manipulated perceptions of racial composition. Third, we find significant racial bias in perceptions of worthiness; the black picture treatment lowers perceived recipient worthiness significantly more among non-black respondents than among black respondents. Finally, we decompose the reduced-form effect of black picture treatment on giving into two channels: one operating via perceptions of recipient worthiness and one running through perceptions of recipient racial composition. The worthiness perceptions channel is statistically significant, while the race perceptions channel is not. Thus, racially biased worthiness perceptions have a significant effect on giving but this effect is not strong enough to cause a significant reduced-form effect of the black picture treatment on giving.
Introduction
There is now broad agreement among social scientists that fairness and race are two of the most important determinants of generosity from the relatively well-off to the poor. 1 Theoretical research on fairness and redistribution from the rich to the poor has focused on the role of beliefs about whether or not the poor are individually responsible for their own bad outcomes, i.e., whether the poor are lazy or industrious (Piketty 1995 , Alesina and Angeletos 2005 , Bénabou and Tirole 2006 . Empirically, people support more redistribution from the rich to the poor when they believe that poverty is caused by exogenous circumstances, as opposed to factors under volitional control. This is the case in both survey data and laboratory experiments on voting for redistribution with monetary stakes (Williamson 1974 , Heclo 1986 , Gilens 1999 , Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001 , Fong 2001 , Corneo and Grüner 2002 , Durante and Putterman 2008 .
2 Meanwhile, findings from laboratory experiments on private giving of money show that subjects allocate more to recipients who, for various reasons, might be perceived as having greater moral worth (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith 1994 , Eckel and Grossman 1996 , Fong 2007 , Cherry and Shogren 2008 , Fong and Oberholzer 2009 .
One interpretation of these findings, from attribution theory in social psychology, is that the industrious poor are assigned greater moral worth than the lazy poor because they are not individually responsible for their own poverty (Weiner 1995) . Another interpretation is that the industrious poor are less likely to be intentionally free-riding on the generosity of tax-payers and donors, which can motivate support via generalized strong reciprocity (Fong, Bowles, and Gintis 2006) . 3 Preferences to give more support to industrious recipients can also be explained by the equity principle of distributive justice, according to which the resources one receives from a system should increase with one's 1 See Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) and Alesina and Giuliano (2009) for reviews. 2 See also Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky (2007) , Di Tella, Donna, and MacCulloch (2008) , and Di
Tella and Dubra (2008) on beliefs and institutions defined more broadly. 3 Strong reciprocity is the propensity to incur pecuniary costs to reward those who have been kind and to punish those who have been unkind (Gintis 2000 , Fehr, Fischbacher, and Gächter 2002 , Bowles and Gintis 2004 . The type of "kindness" that motivates reciprocation involves good intentions, regardless of the outcome of those intentions (Rabin 1993) . The strong reciprocity motive can be generalized such that people may want to reward those who have helped others or society in general and to punish those who have hurt others or society in general (Fong, Bowles, and Gintis 2006, Servátka 2009). inputs into the system (Walster, Walster, and Berscheid 1978, Deutsch 1985) . 4 Moreover, the motives of generalized reciprocity and equity may also lead people to be more generous to recipients who have contributed more to society through means other than their labor effort, e.g., by giving money or time to others, or by being helpful and cooperative. Hence we also expect people to be more generous to recipients who are viewed as relatively generous themselves. For our purposes, the differences between equity theory, attribution theory, and generalized reciprocity are less important than the similarities. They all predict that generosity will be conditioned on beliefs about recipient worthiness.
The evidence of racial discrimination in income redistribution is also compelling.
Across countries, those with more racial or ethnic fractionalization have less governmental redistribution (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2001) . Within the United
States, those states with more ethnic fractionalization spend less on public goods and social services (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999) . Across individuals, those who live in a locality with a higher fraction of welfare recipients of a different race are significantly more opposed to redistribution (Luttmer 2001) , and racial attitudes seem to play an important role in attitudes to redistribution (Gilens 1999 , Lee and Roemer 2006 , Roemer, Lee, and Van der Straeten 2007 . 5 In the private sphere, charitable activity of all-white religious congregations decreases as the fraction of blacks in the community increases (Hungerman 2008) . 4 See Konow (2003) for a review. 5 For recent theoretical work on models of social identity (including racial identity) and redistribution, see Shayo (2009) and Lindqvist and Östling (2009) . 6 There are mixed findings on racial discrimination in other economic settings. There is no consistent evidence of racial discrimination in dictator games (Fershtman and Gneezy 2001, Burns 2004) , and a recent experiment shows higher levels of support for government job training and placement assistance to unemployed blacks than unemployed whites (Pager and Freese 2006) . On the other hand, racial biases have been documented in attitudes to Katrina victims (Iyengar and Hahn 2007, Harris-Lacewell, Imai, and Yamamoto 2007) , and Fong and Luttmer (2009) found racially biased giving against black Katrina victims among respondents who reported subjective feelings of ethnic closeness with whites. See also Munnell et al. (1996) , Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor (1999) , Altonji and Blank (1999) , Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) , Pager, Western, and Bonikowski (2006) , Price and Wolfers (2007) , and Parsons et al. (2009) for evidence of discrimination in housing and labor markets. List (2004) finds statistical discrimination in field experiments on sports card markets. In the political process, racial heterogeneity has been linked to riots (DiPasquale and Glaeser 1998) , lower participation in social activities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) and lower levels of trust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002) . Individuals also prefer to form racially homogenous political jurisdictions (Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby 2004) . Levitt (2004) , Antonovics, Arcidiacono, and Walsh (2005) , and List (2006) find little evidence of racial discrimination in behavior on game shows. See
Finally, prior theory and evidence suggest that fairness motives and racial discrimination interact. Loury (2002) argues that racial inequality stems not from a taste for discrimination, but from causal misattributions in which racial disparities caused by discriminatory social behavior, for which powerful actors would feel responsible, are misattributed to faults or weaknesses of black people themselves. Racial disparities attributed to faults of black people are accepted because powerful actors do not feel responsible for the inequality. This argument relates closely to the fairness literature.
Loury's argument is, essentially, that racial disparity is due to beliefs that lead whites to view blacks as responsible for their own bad outcomes and, thus, morally unworthy of support. Consistent with this theory, racially biased attitudinal opposition to welfare operates via beliefs that poor people are disproportionately black and that black welfare recipients are "lazy" (Gilens 1999 ).
Despite abundant prior evidence that fairness and race affect generosity to the poor, there is no supporting evidence based on studies that simultaneously use (i) real monetary transfers to the poor, (ii) randomized treatments of fairness and race, (iii) a nationally representative sample, and (iv) decision-making in a natural environment. We know of no evidence that is based on all four desiderata. In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we present the results from the first study to produce data based on the first three desiderata: behavioral measures of redistribution to the poor, random manipulations of perceived recipient worthiness and race, and national representativeness. Our experiment is an artefactual field experiment because we use broadly representative subjects (Harrison and List 2004) . We see our paper as complementary to field experiments, which typically meet all desiderata except the third (Frey and Meier 2004 , Croson and Shang Forthcoming, Landry et al. 2006 , Falk 2007 , Karlan and List 2007 , Eckel and Grossman 2008 , DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier 2009 , List and Price 2009 , Meer 2009 ).
Our experiment is a dictator game in which the recipients are local charities that serve the poor in the city of Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Donors consist of approximately 1,000
participants from a nationally representative respondent panel that is maintained by a Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) , Eckel and Wilson (2003) , Bouckaert and Dhaene (2004) , Burns (2006) , and Haile, Sadrieh, and Verbon (2006) on racial or ethnic discrimination in trust games.
private survey research firm, Knowledge Networks. We manipulate the perceived worthiness and race of the charity recipients by showing respondents an audiovisual presentation about the recipients.
The audio information in the presentation contains (among others) four manipulations of information about the worthiness of recipients. These manipulations are meant to roughly capture the notions of worthiness used in the literature summarized above; they manipulate information about the recipients' accountability, or lack thereof, for their poverty, and information about how kindly or unkindly the recipients treat other people.
The visual information in the presentation manipulates perceptions of the racial composition of recipients. Our "black picture treatment" shows photos mostly of black charity recipients while our control treatment shows photos mostly of white charity recipients.
After manipulating perceptions of worthiness and race, we give each respondent a ten percent chance of receiving $100. Prior to learning whether or not they will receive the $100, respondents must decide how much of that sum they would like to donate to the assigned charity in the event that they receive it. Finally, we collect survey data on a variety of attitudes and beliefs, including perceptions of the worthiness and race of the recipients. These perception measures are designed to test whether our treatments successfully manipulated beliefs about the recipients. We find that our treatments did indeed have significant direct effects in the expected direction on perceptions of the worthiness and race of the recipients.
Our experiment generates four main results from our randomized manipulations of perceived worthiness and race. First, manipulations that describe recipients as more worthy ("worthiness treatments") significantly increase giving. Second, our black picture treatment has no significant effect on giving, despite the fact that it successfully manipulates the perceived racial composition. This finding holds both for the entire sample as for subsamples defined by respondent race. Third, we find significant racial bias in perceptions of worthiness such that the black picture treatment lowers perceived recipient worthiness significantly more among non-black respondents than among black respondents, and the worthiness treatments increase the perceived fraction of recipients that belong to the respondent's racial group. Our final finding comes from decomposing the reduced-form black picture treatment effect on giving into two parts: one channel that operates via perceptions of the worthiness of recipients and a second channel that operates through perceptions of the racial composition of recipients. We find that nonblack respondents give significantly less in response to the black picture treatment through the channel that operates via worthiness perceptions, whereas the response operating via perceptions of the racial composition is insignificant (and actually slightly positive). Thus, although the black picture treatment does not have a significant overall effect on giving by non-black respondents, the racially biased worthiness perceptions that result from the black picture treatment do indeed have a significantly negative effect on giving. The overall effect of the black picture treatment on giving is insignificant because it is the sum of a significant negative channel (the racially biased worthiness perceptions)
and an imprecisely estimated channel (the direct effect of race perceptions).
Our finding of significant racial discrimination operating via racially biased perceptions of the worthiness of recipients, and not via perceptions of the racial composition of recipients, is consistent with Loury's argument that "racially biased social cognition," rather than a taste for discrimination, accounts for racial inequality. Our findings are also consistent with prior research showing that racially biased attitudes regarding welfare for the poor are driven by whites' beliefs that blacks are morally unworthy of support -e.g., that blacks are lazy and that they abuse welfare (Gilens 1999 ).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our experimental design, Section 3 presents our results, and Section 4 concludes. Internet or WebTV access and receive monetary incentives from some surveys. Our respondents received whatever monetary payoffs they earned from our experiment.
Experimental Design
Panelists are recruited through random-digit dialing and are then asked to join the Knowledge Networks panel.
In our experiment, we manipulate respondents' perceptions of the poor. More specifically, we focus on perceptions of the worthiness and race of recipients of two local charities in Tuscaloosa, Alabama. We accomplish this with a slideshow that presents eight photographs along with two and a half minutes of audio. The slideshow describes the city of Tuscaloosa, one of two randomly-assigned charities, and recipients of aid from that charity. Half of our respondents saw a slideshow depicting the work of the Salvation Army in Tuscaloosa, and the other half saw a slideshow depicting the work of Temporary Emergency Services in Tuscaloosa.
We took care to manipulate race perceptions in a way that minimized the likelihood that respondents would recognize the racial motivation of our study. Thus, we did not mention the issue of race in the audio part of our slideshow. Instead, we manipulated perceptions of recipient race with the photographs. Half of our respondents saw photos mostly of black charity recipients, and the other half saw photos mostly of white charity recipients. 7 We made the backgrounds of the photos of blacks and whites as similar as possible (nearly identical in most cases) by taking the photos in exactly the same location.
The audio portion of our slideshow was designed to manipulate perceptions of recipient worthiness and other characteristics. We avoid using deception by including different pieces of true information in different treatment conditions. Below we summarize our randomly assigned audio manipulations. The issues being manipulated are in bold text (with the fraction of participants assigned to each condition of the manipulation in parentheses). The treatment conditions for each manipulation are listed together with the values (0 or 1) we give them when they are used as dummy variables.
With one exception, each randomized manipulation contains two conditions. The exception is the reasons for poverty and willingness to work manipulation, in which there 7 We did not show pictures exclusively of one race because that might arouse suspicions among the respondents. Instead, in the black treatment condition, approximately 80% of the pictures are of blacks while in the white treatment condition approximately 80% of the pictures are of whites.
are three conditions. 8 For each manipulation, each respondent was assigned to one and only one treatment condition. The exact wording of the audio conditions is provided in Appendix A.
i) City is Republican (50/50): 0. "Compared to the rest of Alabama, more people in Tuscaloosa vote for the Democratic Party" 1. "Like the rest of Alabama, people in Tuscaloosa vote overwhelmingly for the Republican Party" ii) City is economically advantaged (50/50):
0. "…with a poverty rate that is twice as high as in the rest of the country" 1. "…with a per capita income that is more than 5% higher than the rest of the state" iii) Reason for poverty and willingness to work (50/25/25): Many of the poor in Tuscaloosa are poor because of a. "…a mixture of factors including bad choices…and bad luck" and work ethic not mentioned b. "bad choices" and "many of them wish they could rely on more generous assistance" c. "circumstances beyond their control" and "many of them try to get a job…" iv) Religious (50/50): 0. [Nothing said] 1. Many of the poor in Tuscaloosa "pray to God regularly to ask Him for help" v) Salvation Army (50/50): The charity depicted is 0. Temporary Emergency Services 1. Salvation Army vi) Short-term need for aid (50/50): Many of the charity's recipients use its help 0. "…for long periods of time" 1. "…for short periods of time when it is absolutely necessary" vii) Currently working (50/50): the charity is busy "before people receive their next" 0. "government benefits check" 1. "paycheck" viii) Sharing own aid with others (50/50): "Many recipients are" 0. "competitive about getting aid" 1. "willing to share their allotment with others in need" ix) Law-abiding (50/50): It is often hard for recipients to get well-paying jobs because "many employers are reluctant to hire" 0. "people who have a criminal record" 1. "them"
Immediately following the slideshow, we measure generosity to the poor in Tuscaloosa with actual giving to the charity depicted in the slideshow. We explain that we will give $100 to one out of every ten participants in this study and ask all 8 In the reasons for poverty and willingness to work manipulation, we assigned 50% to the default condition in which we said nothing about the work ethic of the poor and said that the reasons for poverty are a mixture of factors including bad choices and circumstances beyond control. Among the other 50% of subjects, half were assigned to the Reason for poverty bad choices, not willing to work condition and half were assigned to the Reason for poverty beyond control, willing to work condition. The actual number of observations in each condition differs slightly from 50% or 25% because of non-response (see Section 3 for details about excluded participants). The actual fraction of participants in each treatment condition is presented in Table 1. respondents to decide in advance how much of that money they would like to give to the Tuscaloosa charity. Finally, we ask a series of questions about racial beliefs. Placing these questions at the end of our instrument was part of our effort to minimize the chances that respondents would suspect that the study was about race, at least until after they had answered all of our other questions. We measure beliefs about the racial composition of the recipients with a question about the perceived fraction of recipients who are white, the perceived fraction who are black, and the perceived fraction who are another race. We also measure beliefs about the racial composition of the small city, the respondents' social contact with people of other races, and attitudes about racial inequality of opportunity. 
Results
The experiment was fielded in 2006, from August 28 to September 20. A total of 1167 respondents participated, but we limit our sample to the 989 individuals who indicated that they could clearly hear the speaker in our audio presentation. An additional seven respondents did not answer the question about how much they would like to give during the experiment, so we also drop these observations. Our final sample consists of 982 respondents, of which 204 are black. Since we oversampled black respondents, we weight all of our results to correct for this oversampling. Appendix Table 1 compares the means and standard deviations of demographic variables in our Knowledge Networks data to those in the June 2006 Current Population Survey. The demographic means are roughly similar in magnitude even though there are significant differences in age, education, income, household structure, and marital status. There are no significant differences in the means of race, region, and work status dummies (except for a marginally significant difference in the fraction of respondents who are disabled). Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full weighted sample. The average donation was $58.7 (s.d. = $37.2), and roughly 11% of the respondents gave zero. About 21% of the sample gave the median donation of $50, and about 36% of the respondents gave the full $100. The total payout from the experiment to the charities was $5995. Figure 1 presents the cumulative density function of giving during the experiment for the full weighted sample. Slightly more than 20% gave between zero and $50, and approximately 10% of the respondents gave between $50 and $100.
The fairly high level of giving in this experiment is not surprising. In standard laboratory dictator games, in which students give anonymously to other students, average donations are around 10%-15% of the total (Camerer 2003). However, several dictator game experiments on giving to charities have shown much higher levels of giving when recipients presumably appear to be needy and worthy. University students in a laboratory dictator game gave three times more to the American Red Cross than to anonymous subjects -31.0% of the pie on average versus 10.6% (Eckel and Grossman 1996) . In a $5.00 dictator game experiment where dictators sampled from the general public could donate money to Habitat for Humanity recipients, participants gave roughly 50% of the pie on average (Small and Loewenstein 2003) . This occurred despite the fact that dictators were playing with their own $5.00 participation fee, which they earned by completing a survey. Subjects in $100 dictator games, where payoffs were implemented with probability 0.1 and the recipients were charities of the dictators' choosing, gave 68% of the pie on average (Carpenter, Connolly, and Myers 2008) . These subjects came from two populations -college students and the broader community. Subjects from the broader population gave $72.3 on average and subjects from the student population gave $54.7 on average. Even higher levels of giving, 86% of the pie on average, occurred in a dictator game where dictators could contribute money toward donations of medicine to centers in Asia, Africa, and South America (Aguiar, Brañas-Garza, and Miller 2008) .
12 Finally, in an experiment similar to this one, where a nationally representative sample played dictator games in which the recipients were victims of Hurricane Katrina, the average offer was $65 out of $100 (Fong and Luttmer 2009 ).
Other factors that may have increased average giving in our experiment include social or psychological proximity, which can be increased by providing information about recipients (Bohnet and Frey 1999 , Small and Loewenstein 2003 , Charness and Gneezy 2008 , and our lottery method of assigning endowments to respondents, which may have decreased their sense of entitlement to the sum (Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith 1994) . 13 Since so many factors can affect the overall level of giving in dictator games, our interest lies primarily in the marginal effects of our treatment conditions and background variables. We use the dictator game simply as a tool to obtain a measure of generosity towards the poor that is based on an actual, payoff-relevant choice. We therefore do not interpret average giving in this experiment as an estimate of the marginal propensity to give.
Treatment effects on giving
In this subsection we examine the direct effects of our treatments on giving. In Table 2 we show that while there are robust significant effects of the worthiness treatments on 12 Donations were made in five Euro increments from a fifteen Euro pie, which may have affected the results somewhat. 13 Another design feature that may affect offers is delaying the implementation of the respondents' payoffs and the charitable donations to a later date. This might further reduce respondents' sense of entitlement to the money, but it might also have effects of unknown direction. For instance, it might change the warm glow associated with giving in unknown ways.
giving, there is no overall effect of recipient race on giving. We show in Appendix Table   3 that these results are robust to a plethora of alternative specifications. Table 2 presents OLS regressions of giving in the experiment on our treatment conditions and demographic controls. The first column presents the effects of each treatment condition in the whole sample. The first four rows of coefficients and standard errors in column 1 present the effects of the treatments designed to manipulate perceived worthiness. When these treatments are included separately, three of the four effects are in the expected direction, but only the "shares own aid with others" treatment has a statistically significant effect on giving (in the expected direction). The row labeled "Black Picture" shows that that the black picture treatment reduces giving by $2.2 with a standard error of $2.3. This treatment effect is less than 4% of the mean offer of $59 (see Table 1 ). The 95%-confidence interval on this effect is -$6.7 to $2.3. Thus, at this level of confidence, we cannot rule out a negative effect of black pictures of 11% of the $59 mean. Finally, the remaining treatment conditions have small and statistically insignificant effects.
In the second column, we show the effect of the average of the four manipulations of perceived worthiness rather than showing the effect of each worthiness treatment separately. This measure is constructed from the four audio manipulations of perceived worthiness that were included separately in column 1. 14 For this composite measure, we reverse coded the "poverty caused by bad choices" treatment so that its intended effect is measured in the same direction as the other treatments. Our derived measure of the mean of these treatments ranges from zero to one, decreases by .25 for those who are assigned to (ii) and increases by .25 for each of the conditions (i), (iii), and (iv) to which a respondent is assigned. The row labeled "# Worthiness Treatments" shows that the combined effect of the perceived worthiness manipulations is positive and significant at the five-percent level. Respondents who hear four treatments describing the recipients as worthy give, on average, $11.0 more than those who hear the four alternative treatments that describe recipients as unworthy. This establishes that there is a causal effect of information about worthiness on giving. Column 3 presents the same specification as column 2, except that we restrict the sample to individuals who responded to all of the worthiness and race perceptions measures. The results of column 3 are similar to the results of column 2.
Columns 4 and 5 present the same regression as in column 3, but for these columns the sample used in column 3 is split into non-black and black respondents, respectively.
The effect of the number of perceived worthiness treatments is positive and highly significant for non-black respondents but negative and not statistically significant for black respondents. This null finding may indicate that, among blacks, the number of worthiness treatments has a weaker effect on worthiness perceptions than among nonblacks (see Table 3 ). In both columns the effect of black pictures is statistically insignificant, but relatively precisely estimated. None of the other treatment effects are significant at the 5 percent level.
Finally, column 6 presents a regression of giving on the same variables and sample as in column 3 but with interaction effects included. The combined effect of the worthiness treatments is $14.5 and is significant at the one-percent level. The interaction term between the number of worthiness perception treatments and black respondent is negative and significant. This reflects the difference between black and non-black respondents in their responses to the worthiness perception treatments: responding to worthiness perceptions in the predicted manner is a non-black phenomenon in our experiment. 15 As with the other regressions, column 6 shows a statistically insignificant effect of the race treatment. The point estimate indicates that non-black respondents give $2.1 less after seeing black pictures. The interaction between the black-picture treatment and black respondent is small and insignificant. The interaction effect of $0.9 indicates that the reaction of black respondents to the black picture treatment is almost identical to the reaction of non-blacks, though the standard error of $5.4 limits our ability to reject moderate amounts of racial bias. Finally, none of the other treatment effects are significant. Table 3 presents the effects of our worthiness and race treatments on perceptions of the worthiness and race of the charity recipients. The control variables in Table 3 are the same as those used in Table 2 . This table shows that, by and large, our treatments successfully manipulated the perceptions they were designed to affect. It also shows racial bias in perceptions stemming from both the worthiness and race manipulations.
Treatment effects on perceptions of worthiness and race of charity recipients
First, non-black respondents who view black recipients judge them to be less worthy, and they do so to a significantly greater extent than black respondents. Second, subjects who hear that the recipients are worthy are more likely to perceive that the recipients are of their own race.
In Table 3 , we use composite measures of the worthiness treatments and the worthiness perceptions to summarize the results more compactly and give us more statistical power. In Appendix Table 2 , we present the disaggregated effects of each of our treatments. Among other things, Appendix Table 2 shows that the separate worthiness treatments had effects on corresponding worthiness perceptions in the expected directions.
Our composite measure of worthiness treatments is the one used in Table 2 , namely the average number of worthiness treatments to which the respondent was exposed. Our composite measure of worthiness perceptions is the average of the responses to the five worthiness perceptions questions listed in Section 2. 16 This measure ranges from zero to 100.
The columns of Table 3 presents results for the entire sample (col. 1), the sample of non-black respondents (col. 2), and the sample of black respondents (col. 3). Column 4 presents the results for the whole sample from a regression that includes an interaction term between respondent race and the number of worthiness treatments and an interaction term between respondent race and the black picture treatment.
Panel A presents regressions where the outcome variable is perceptions of the worthiness of the charity recipients. The first row shows that in all columns, the 16 The five worthiness perceptions questions are the percentage of the charity's recipients who (i) are poor mainly because of bad choices (reverse coded), (ii) are poor because of reasons beyond individual control, (iii) are willing to work hard in order to get ahead in life, (iv) have a criminal record (reverse coded), and (v) are willing to share their own aid. The perceptions measures not included in this worthiness perceptions measure correspond to treatment conditions not included in the worthiness manipulation measure. These perceptions questions were designed to check the effectiveness of treatments intended to manipulate background characteristics other than worthiness.
worthiness treatments have significant positive effects on the perceived worthiness of the recipients, confirming that our treatment successfully manipulated worthiness perceptions. In addition, non-black respondents' perceptions of worthiness are significantly more sensitive to our worthiness manipulations than the perceptions of black respondents, which would be consistent with non-blacks being less familiar with aid recipients, and therefore having weaker priors about them. The second row shows that in the whole sample and the non-black sample, black photos have a highly significant negative effect on the perception of worthiness. In contrast, among blacks, black photos have a small and insignificant effect on the perception of worthiness. Moreover, column 4 shows that the interaction between respondent race and the black photo treatment is positive and statistically significant. That is, black respondents seeing black photos rate aid recipients as more worthy than do non-black respondents, and this difference is statistically significant. This is evidence of racially biased perceptions of worthiness.
Panel B presents regressions where the outcome variable is the perceived percentage of charity recipients that is black minus the perceived percentage that is white. 17 The first row of Panel B presents the effect of the number of worthiness treatments on the racial perception variable. Column 4 shows a marginally significant interaction between the number of worthiness manipulations and respondent race, which indicates that the effect of the worthiness treatments is different for black and non-black respondents. According to this interaction effect, people are more likely to think of worthy recipients as coming from their own racial group. This hints at racial bias in perceptions and mirrors the effect in Panel A where the effect of the black picture treatment on perceived worthiness is significantly different, i.e. significantly less negative, for black respondents than nonblack respondents. In every column of Panel B, the black picture treatment has a highly significant positive effect on the perceived percentage black recipients relative to the percentage white recipients, with effects ranging from 21 to 28 percentage points. This is evidence that the race treatment successfully manipulated perceptions of the racial composition of charity recipients.
Thus, there are two important results in Table 3 . First, the table shows that the worthiness treatments successfully manipulated worthiness perceptions and the black picture manipulation successfully manipulated racial perceptions. Second, there is evidence of racial group loyalty in the formation of perceptions, stemming from both the worthiness and race manipulations. Panel A shows that non-black respondents view black recipients as less worthy and do so to a significantly greater extent than black respondents. Analogously, Panel B shows that blacks who hear that the recipients are worthy are more likely than non-blacks who hear the same information to perceive that the recipients shown in the photos are black. These findings are consistent with results from the social categorization literature in social psychology which suggest that people tend to hold out-group members individually responsible for their own poor outcomes while people tend to attribute poor outcomes of "in-group" members to adverse external circumstances (Brewer and Miller 1996) .
Effects of perceptions on giving
In Table 4 , we turn to the effects of worthiness and race perceptions (as opposed to treatments) on giving. Panel A presents the effects of our endogenous measures of perceptions on giving using OLS. Panel B presents causal estimates of the effects of worthiness and race perceptions by instrumenting these perceptions with the number of worthiness treatments and the black picture treatment. For the instrumental-variables regression to be valid, the treatments that we used to manipulate perceived worthiness and race cannot have effects on giving other than through their effects on our measures of perceptions of worthiness and race. We believe that this is plausible but acknowledge that there could be other channels. For instance, the treatments may affect giving directly via unconscious beliefs, or people could lie about their perceptions.
The independent variables in Table 4 are identical to the dependent variables in Table   3 and are measured on scales from 0 to 100. Panel A presents OLS regressions of giving on the average response to the five worthiness perceptions questions and the perceived fraction of welfare recipients who are black-minus-white, controlling for the other treatments and demographic variables that were included in Tables 2 and 3 . Note that these measures may be endogenous to respondents' donation decisions because perceptions may have formed in response to unobserved variables that also affect giving.
Moreover, we measure perceptions after respondents decide how much to give to the recipients, so reported perceptions may also to some extent reflect prior behavior rather than cause it. Thus, in Panel B, we present the instrumental-variables estimates of the effects of worthiness and race perceptions on giving. In both panels, columns 1-4 present the regressions, respectively, for all respondents, non-black respondents, black respondents, and all respondents with interactions between worthiness perceptions and respondent race, and race perceptions and respondent race. All columns use the sample of respondents who responded to all of the race and worthiness perceptions questions.
The first rows in the first column of each panel show that the effects of both endogenous and exogenous worthiness perceptions are positive and significant in the whole sample. The IV estimate is noteworthy in at least two respects. First, it allows us to scale the effect of the worthiness treatments in terms of worthiness perceptions, and this reveals that the treatment effect is large in economic terms: a ten percentage point increase in the average perceived worthiness of recipients increases giving by $7.5.
Second, the IV estimate is larger than the OLS estimate. Our interpretation of this finding is that the worthiness perceptions measures are likely to be poorly measured. If there is measurement error, then the OLS estimates are biased toward zero. The IV estimates, in contrast, do not suffer from attenuation bias induced by measurement error. Thus, our IV estimates address both the endogeneity and measurement error problems that are likely to be present in the OLS estimates. Columns 2 and 3 present these results for the subsamples of non-black and black respondents, respectively. The results in column 2 are similar to the results in column 1. The results in the black sample are mostly insignificant, except for a marginally significant effect of worthiness perceptions in the expected direction in the OLS regression.
The second rows in Panels A and B indicate that the effects of both endogenous and exogenous perceptions of recipient race on giving are close to zero and statistically insignificant. The point estimates in column 1 (whole sample) indicate that, if the perceived fraction of recipients that is black minus the perceived fraction that is white increases by ten percentage points, giving in our experiment increases by $0.1 in the OLS regression and by $0.3 in the IV regression. Recall that these results are from giving out of a total amount of $100, where the mean gift is about $60.
Column 4 presents OLS and IV estimates in the whole sample, with the race and worthiness perceptions measures interacted with respondent race. The first two rows in each regression show the effect of the worthiness and race perceptions on giving among non-blacks. As expected, both the OLS and IV estimates are similar to those of column 1.
The third and fourth rows of each regression present the interactions between the perceptions variables and a dummy for a black respondent. These interaction effects are not statistically significant.
Decomposition of reduced-form treatment effects
Looking across all of the results presented above, there appears to be a contradiction. Table 3 presented evidence of racial bias in worthiness perceptions; in particular, the black picture treatment causes non-black respondents to perceive recipients as significantly less worthy (Panel A, column 2). The IV regressions in Table 4 show there is a statistically significant causal effect of worthiness perceptions on giving by nonblacks (Panel B, column 2). Yet, in Table 2 , we found no statistically significant evidence of the black picture treatment on giving by non-blacks (column 4). To resolve this apparent contradiction, we decompose the effects of our worthiness and race treatments on giving, respectively, into two channels: one that runs via worthiness perceptions and one that runs via perceptions of race. Both decompositions show that the component of our manipulations that operates via worthiness perceptions is statistically significant, while the component that operates via perceptions of the racial composition is not significant. 
) . Implicit in this formulation is the identifying assumption of the IV regression, namely that the race and worthiness treatments only affect giving through their effects on race and worthiness perceptions. Under this assumption, the total effects of the worthiness and racial treatments on giving can each be decomposed into two channels:
In Equation 1, the left-hand side is the total effect, or reduced-form effect, of the worthiness treatments on giving whereas the right-hand side shows the decomposition.
The first term in square brackets shows the effect of the worthiness treatments on giving via the channel of worthiness perceptions, and the second term in square brackets shows the effect of the worthiness treatments on giving via the channel of race perceptions. We will refer to these components, respectively, as the worthiness perceptions channel and the racial perceptions channel of the worthiness treatments. Equation 2 shows the analogous decomposition of the reduced-form effect of the race treatment on giving. We will refer to the two components of Equation 2 as, respectively, the worthiness perceptions channel and the racial perceptions channel of the race treatment.
Empirically, the reduced-form effects of the worthiness and race treatments in our experiment are our main treatment effects presented in Table 2 , namely, the effect of the number of worthiness treatments (#Worthiness Treatments) and the race treatment (Black Picture) on offers in our dictator game (Giving). Since the treatments are randomly assigned, these are causal estimates. As we saw in Table 2 , the reduced-form effect of the worthiness treatments on giving is positive and significant, and the reduced-form effect of the race treatment on giving is negative but small and insignificant.
To decompose each of the reduced-form effects from our experiment into the worthiness perceptions channels and the race perceptions channels shown in Equations 1 and 2, we employ our two perceptions variables: perceptions of the worthiness of Table 4, give us the causal effects of worthiness and race perceptions on giving. These are This mechanism is consistent with prior findings from attitudinal data which show that racially biased opposition to welfare is driven by racially biased perceptions of moral worthiness (Gilens 1999) .
External validity check
How well might the results of our experiment generalize to natural giving outside of the experiment? One way to investigate the external validity of our results is to estimate the extent to which giving in our experiment corresponds to total charitable giving in the previous calendar year. In unreported results, we find that total charitable giving in 2005 has a statistically significant positive effect on giving in the experiment. However, a drawback of this simple regression is that measurement error in charitable giving leads to attenuation bias in the estimated effect. Hence, it does not provide a good estimate of the sensitivity of giving in the experiment to total charitable giving. As a validity check that circumvents attenuation bias from measurement error, we investigate whether demographic characteristics that predict total charitable giving in 2005 similarly predict giving in our experiment. Table 5 presents this analysis.
Column 1 regresses giving during our experiment measured in dollars on respondent demographic characteristics. Column 2 regresses a transformed measure of total charitable giving in 2005 on the same demographic characteristics included in column 1.
To make the dependent measures in columns 1 and 2 comparable, we first topcode total charitable giving in 2005 at $500 so that the fraction of people giving the maximum amount is equal across the two measures. Then we divide total charitable giving in 2005
by 5 so that both giving measures range from zero to $100. The key result from columns 1 and 2 is that the explanatory power of the demographic variables is higher in column 2 than in column 1. Moreover, the coefficients in column 2 tend to have a larger absolute value than the coefficients in column 1, and the percent of the variation in giving that is explained by the demographic variables is roughly two times higher in column 2 (R 2 = 0.208) than in column 1 (R 2 = 0.098). This is a first indication that giving during the experiment is somewhat less responsive to demographics than actual past charitable giving.
The regressions in columns 1 and 2 show that the demographic variables tend to have effects in the same direction on giving in our experiment and on past charitable giving;
we do not see any demographic variables that have a significant positive effect in one of the columns and a significant negative effect in the other. as responsive to the demographic variables as past charitable giving. In summary, giving in our experiment is somewhere between 43% and 85% as sensitive to the demographic variables as charitable giving in the real world. These results suggest that perceptions of the worthiness of the poor may also have a greater effect on charitable giving in the real world than they have on giving during the experiment.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the results from an experiment that examines how charitable giving to the poor responds to the perceived worthiness and race of charity recipients.
The experiment was conducted on a sample of about 1000 respondents that is broadly representative of the U.S. adult population. We showed an audiovisual presentation about a charity, the charity's recipients, and the city in which recipients were located to manipulate respondents' perceptions of recipient worthiness and race. Following the presentation, the respondents decided how to distribute $100 between themselves and the charity. Subsequently, we asked the respondents about their perceptions of the worthiness and race of the charity's recipients, which confirmed that our treatments successfully manipulated the respondents' perceptions.
The experiment yielded four main results. First, respondents give significantly more when given information suggesting that recipients are more worthy. This effect is large in economic terms; audio treatments that raise the perceived fraction of worthy recipients by 10 percentage points cause the respondents to increase their giving by $7.5 relative to a mean level of giving of $58.7. Second, we find no significant effect of our race treatment on giving. Third, we find a racial group loyalty effect on perceptions: Respondents rate recipients as relatively more worthy when shown pictures of recipients from their own racial group, and conversely, they perceive a higher fraction of recipients as being from their own racial group if the audio story describes recipients in more worthy terms.
Finally, the components of our worthiness and race treatments that operate through worthiness perceptions are statistically significant, while the components that operate through perceptions of the racial composition of recipients are insignificant. Our finding of racial discrimination that operates via racially biased worthiness perceptions is consistent with evidence from attitudinal data that opposition to welfare is determined to a large extent by racially biased attitudes about the worthiness of black welfare recipients (Gilens 1999) .
It is important to note, however, that despite the methodological advantages of our study -namely, using randomly varied perceptions as the independent variables and real behavior as the outcome variable -there are some disadvantages. In particular, respondents in our study were forced to make their donation decisions in a somewhat artificial setting, and they may have also suspected that they were being studied. Both of these factors may have affected our results. Because racial discrimination is seen by many as socially undesirable, our design may be less effective at picking up racial discrimination based directly on perceptions of race than other more socially acceptable behaviors, such as giving according to perceived worthiness. Thus, it seems plausible that any additional racial discrimination, beyond discrimination based on racially biased perceptions of worthiness, would not be detected by our experiment.
Appendix A: Charity Survey Instrument
• Text that is notes is bold and in brackets. Text that is the name of a question or a variable name is in brackets and capital letters.
• Audio text that respondents hear is in italics; all other text the respondents read.
• For multiple choice questions they were given radio buttons to click on, in this appendix that feature shows up as numbered options [1], [2], [3], this is different from audio treatments which are distinguished (0), (1).
• Separating lines correspond to new screens.
• [CHARITY] was replaced in both the text and the audio with either the words "Salvation Army" or the words "Temporary Emergency Services" depending on the treatment.
• There are a total of 11 experimental treatments: [CHARITY] , the name of the charity shown in the presentation, [ --Main Questionnaire --─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── This is a study conducted by researchers at Carnegie Mellon University and Harvard University. The general topic is assistance to the poor and other issues facing America. Generally the recipients are unhappy about their situation and wish they had more money.
Many of them try to get a job that pays enough for them to stand on their own feet and no longer rely on assistance from the government and charities.
[ 
[IF RESPONDENT SELECTS 1 ("DIDN'T HEAR ANY SOUND") OR 2 ("COULDN'T UNDERSTAND WHAT SHE WAS SAYING") SURVEY SKIPS TO DISPLAY SCREEN AT THE BEGINNING OF PART IV. ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── PART II. DECISION-MAKING TASK
Decision-making task Now, you are going to make a decision involving [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa. Please note that all information we give you is true and all payments will be made exactly as stated. Please think carefully about your decision because one out of every 10 participants in this study will have his or her decision carried out with real money. ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── We will give $100 to one out of every 10 participants in this study. We ask you to decide in advance how much of this $100, if any, you would like to give to [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa. You can give any amount you wish, including nothing. If you are selected, this $100 is yours, and you are free to keep or to give away any amount you wish, including nothing. While many people give some away, we expect that most people will keep at least some of this amount for themselves.
If you are randomly selected to receive $100, we will send the amount that you want to donate, if any, to [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa. The amount that you decide to keep for yourself will be credited to your Knowledge Networks account (you get 1000 bonus points for each dollar you decide to keep).
If you decide to donate money, [CHARITY] in Tuscaloosa will mail you a note to confirm that we sent them exactly the amount you specified. As a reference, the Federal poverty standard is currently about $20,000 for a family of 4, and exactly half of all households in the U.S. have an income less than $44,000 per year.
My best guess is that the median household income of recipients of [CHARITY] We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. Below, we list two of these problems. For each one, please tell us whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount.
Programs for the poor (e.g., "welfare" or programs like TANF, food stamps, and public housing) Spending too LITTLE Now, we'd like to ask about your charitable giving to help poor people in your local area. By "local area" we mean the greater metropolitan area of the town or city that you live in or near. If you live in a rural area and are not part of a greater metropolitan area, then "local area" means your county.
What, approximately, is the total amount of money that you and people in your household have donated in 2005 to charities that help poor people in your local area?
Now, we would like to ask you about some of the possible reasons why people are poor.
For each of the possible reasons listed below, please tell us how important you believe it is in explaining why some people in this country are poor.
Failure of society to provide good schools for everyone Not at all important Somewhat important Total Effect: -3.7 + 1.6 = -2.1 (2.6) [ Note: Results are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. The sample is limited to respondents with nonmissing race and worthiness perceptions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. The variable # Worthiness Treatments is the average of the following four audio treatments: Reasons for poverty bad choices (reverse coded), reasons for poverty beyond control, law abiding, and willing to share own aid. The variable Worthiness Perceptions is the average of the five corresponding perceptions questions: Reasons for poverty bad choices (reverse coded), reasons for poverty beyond control, willing to work, possessing a criminal record (reverse coded), and willing to share own aid. The controls for other treatments consist of the following six treatment variables: short-term need for aid, currently working, religious, city republican, city economically advantaged, and salvation army. The demographic controls consist of the variables listed under the heading "control variables" in Table 1 . Note: Results are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. The sample is limited to respondents with nonmissing race and worthiness perceptions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. The variable Worthiness Perceptions is the average of the five corresponding perceptions questions: Reasons for poverty bad choices (reverse coded), reasons for poverty beyond control, willing to work, possessing a criminal record (reverse coded), and willing to share own aid. The controls for other treatments consist of the following six treatment variables: short-term need for aid, currently working, religious, city republican, city economically advantaged, and salvation army. The demographic controls consist of the variables listed under the heading "control variables" in Table 1 . In columns 1-3 of Panel B, race perceptions and worthiness perceptions are instrumented by the black picture treatment and by the number of worthiness treatments. In column 4 of Panel B the instruments also include the interaction between the number of worthiness treatments and respondent race, and the interaction between the black picture treatment and respondent race. Note: Results are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the number of dollars given during the experiment (out of $100). The dependent variable in columns (2) and (4) is a transformed measure of total self-reported charitable giving in 2005. To make the scale of the charitable giving variable comparable to the scale of giving during the experiment, we topcode charitable giving at $500 so that the fraction of individuals giving the maximum amount is equal. Next, we divide the charitable giving variable by 5, so that both dependent variables are measured on a 0-100 scale. The variable Predicted Charitable Giving is the amount predicted by the regression in column (2). The variable Predicted Giving in Experiment is the amount predicted by the regression in column (1). (4) 2.6 (1.6) 1.6 (1.5) 0.8 (1. Note: Results are weighted to correct for oversampling of black respondents. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels: * 10 percent; ** 5 percent; *** 1 percent. See notes to Table 2a .
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